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Meta-
A prefIX (from Greek 1.1£,['(L in the sense of 'after,' 'in consideration of,' 'pre-: 'U'ans-' ), 
the mcu- of metaphysics has its origin in the bibliographical classification of ·Aristotle's 
work of that title, coming after the works concerning natural science (physica). It 
acquired its primary meaning through Alexander of Aphrodisias: 1tp6c; >'illa. ('for us') 
metaphysics comes after natural science, although, as knowledge from first principles, 
logically it should precede it. 
The prefix mtla- normally precedes the name of a discipline if it is a question of the 
terminology or principles of that discipline, or if - more rarely - aspects transcending 
the discipline are being discussed. For semiotics, the terms of special relevance are: ·mt-
talanguagt and metalerm; metasemiotia and metasign, and metaethi~ ""etalogic, and 
metascienu. 
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Metalanguage and Metattnn 
The constitution of a metalanguage serves a double purpose; first, it serves to avoid the 
antinomies of logic, and second, it makes possible an exact "semantics of (e.g., formal. 
ized) ·Ianguages. From the first point of view. metalangU4ge has a long history. Already 
Sextus Empiricus made the distinction between different levels of language in order to 
eliminate sophisms. Later, ·Porphyry inuoduccd the distinction between prote thesis 
and dewtl!ra thesis, the latter describing the syntactical functions of words. "Augustine dif-
ferentiates between nomen rei <·name of thing' and nomen nominis 'name of mune'. In 
scholastic philosophy, the distinction is made in the same sense between intentio prima 
'first intention' and inttntio secunda 'second intention,' which includes metaterms such 
as lenninN$, NnifJenale, proposilio, genus, etc. Buridanus explicitly uses this doctrine of 
intentions to dissolve logical antinomies. 
In modem times. the term metalanguage originated in "Ldniewski (farski 1935:1-8; 
Luschei 1962 :34£.), but, at least implicitly, "Frege had already anticipated this distinction 
by differentiating between "auxiliary language" and "language of explanation," in 
which thoughts are developed concerning the referential function of auxiliary language 
(Frege 1962b:I,., 1969:180). In Carnap (193"), metalanguage i, '0 conceived that 
it includes all expressions referring to all elements of object-language. i.e., object-signs, 
qualities, and connections of expressions and the rules of their definition and substitu· 
tlOR. 
Melasemiotics and Metas;gn 
A5 distinct from semiotics, which describes object-signs with regard to their semiosic 
character, meusemiotics refers to the notion of signs as signs. This may be done in a 
scientific·theoretical way or in a practical-communicative way. In the case of the latter, 
"Hjelmslev regards metasemioucs as being an explicitly connotative language, i.e., its 
level of "expression is itself a language consisting of a level of expression and a level of 
"meaning (d. for example, styles, "code variations, dialectS and "idiolectS). Scientific 
metasemiotics describes the notion of "sign" ; it consists of metasigns (Nattiez 1979b: 
389-99). 
These types of meusemiotics are presented, without necessarily being explicitJy 
named as such, at the beginning of most semiological treatises, in an attempt to define 
the term Hsign." For that purpose there are very different approaches, the most impor· 
tant of them being the semiolics of "Peirce and "Morris and simi%git, from the 
"'German Enlightenment to "Saussure. The first position bases the concept of a sign on 
the concept of interpretant, while the second originates from the correlation of twO 
Structures determining the position (""leNT) of "signifier and signified. In the first case, 
metasemiotics has to elucidate the notion of rules before the conetpt of sign can be 
defined. In the second case, the notion of the "sign system" must be clarified before one 
can recognize what a sign is. In the [leSt case, mewemiotics describes the genesis and 
validity of norms for the use of signs; in the second case it describes suuctures the ele-
ments of which are signs. These two paradigms can hardly be unified upless one wants 
to commit the naturalisticfallacy (Hubig 1980: 217 f.) 
MttaLmgUllgt 531 
Metatlhia, MetA/ogic, 4n4 Mel4science 
Metaethics is, according to Hare (1952 : iii), the logical study of the language of morals. 
Nowell-Smith considers its funaion to be descriptive (1969 : 181) and explanatory of the 
way moral terms are used. Metaethics is descriptive and neutral (Ayer in Nowell-Smith 
1969: 19£1.), including all ethics, orforming only an epistemological approach to ethics 
(Brand 1959). Metalogic means the theory of the "syntax and semanucs of formal lan-
guages and systems (d., e.g.) the results of "'model theory of GOdel : Wang 1974; 
166-80). Metascience describes the practice of research in the different sciences (Rad-
nitzky '1973 : xiii f., If.; Hubig 1978 : 32 ff.) C.H. 
